

I

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Postmodernism and philosophy

This is the end

Postmodernist thinking has typically reacted with suspicion to the notion of origins. As first cause or foundation, an origin – a transcendental ground to which all subsequent phenomena must pay obeisance – resurrects the deity that the “death of God” supposedly vanquished. This resistance to origins is matched by a much messier obsession with “ends.” Postmodernist endings are not so neat as the term suggests, however. They are thorny and recalcitrant, at the very least placing certain practices or instruments of thought off-limits; at most, the latter are rendered fallacious, untenable, “no longer possible.”

An abiding example of this temper is the seemingly suicidal declamation of the end of philosophy. Where philosophy has engaged directly with postmodernism – let us call the result, for the moment, post-Nietzschean continental philosophy – it has produced a kind of thinking that cleaves to the shadow of its own mortality, compulsively rehearsing its own demise. But unlike other postmodernist annulments – the “ends” of authorial presence and ideology, for example – philosophy’s reprieve was granted in the same breath as its death sentence was pronounced. Which is to say, accompanying the termination was the possibility of renewal, ways of finding new uses for philosophical thinking. In fixating upon the conditions of its own abolition, then, philosophy turned those conditions into a kind of negative capability.

Postwar French philosophers have generally repudiated the notion of the end of philosophy. Luce Irigaray derided it as one of the “status quo values.”¹ Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari declared that “the overcoming of philosophy has never been a problem for us: it is just tiresome, idle chatter.”² Even more categorically, Jacques Derrida has stated, “I do not at all believe in what today is so easily called the death of philosophy (nor, moreover, in the simple death of whatever – the book, man, or god, especially since, as we all know, what is dead wields a very specific power).”³ Derrida illustrates this

in his discussion of “The End of the Book and the Beginning of Writing.” He describes the book as the idea of a totality, an idea that is “profoundly alien to the sense of writing.” It is necessary to recognize the monolithic, encyclopedic, theological character of the book, he declares, in order to countermand it with the dispersive, “aphoristic energy” of writing.⁴ But what takes place is not a mere replacement or taking-up; it is a superposition of one with the other, so that neither writing nor book can be said truly to begin or end. Derrida posits the *closure* of the idea of the book, permitting its indefinite continuation, rather than the more definitive *end*.⁵

It is not so much a process of completion, then, as a complex maneuvering between ending and renewal. To carry out this maneuver, philosophical postmodernism has performed a comprehensive demolition job on western orthodoxies. Knowledge is deemed questionable, and it is no longer the job of philosophy to provide it. The human subject is dispossessed until it seems no longer to exist (perhaps it never did), and its philosophical corollary, humanism, is unmasked as a form of covert oppression. Narrative logic is broken down, removing one of the central organizing principles of western thought. The notion of the “real world” is permanently encased in quotation marks, and even such an (apparently) uncomplicated matter as sexual difference is rendered illegitimate and misleading, while newer, more difficult ways of theorizing gender are opened up.

What all of the above share is a resistance to totality (in particular, the philosophical systems comprising the western tradition), to teleology (the notion that those systems might be going somewhere in particular) and to closure of any kind – narrative, conceptual, metaphysical. Within the philosophical tradition, the two chief advocates of the above are Descartes, whose method of radical scepticism led to the foundationalist claim that a correct beginning could finally be made; and Hegel, whose synthetic approach first of all organized the entire tradition into a purposive and dialectical whole, and then assumed that it had reached its apogee, with no further work to be done. The rest of this essay will examine the postmodernist reaction to this legacy – the major philosophical attempts to reveal its gaps, inconsistencies, and shortcomings, and the efforts made to bring it to an end.

Any account of postmodernism and philosophy must deal with the problem of naming. Put simply, the two terms cannot stay separate for long. Philosophy slides into “theory,” which combines philosophical reflection with elements of sociology, historiography, psychoanalysis, politics, anthropology, mythology, and literature. And postmodernism mutates into “post-structuralism,” the term most associated with the above-mentioned *mélange*. It is prudent to note, therefore, that, once the theme of the “end of philosophy” has been invoked, the discussion cannot be restricted to (as it were)

philosophical concerns – as those concerns have generally been recognized and understood, within the western tradition. The theme has also given rise to a form of writing that signifies a revolution at the level of style. Indeed, it amounts to the overthrow of yet another “orthodoxy”: the notion that philosophical thinking can be conveyed in the language of proposition and logical argument. More so than in, say, the novel or the poem, the post-modernist influence on philosophy brings to mind the difficult, disorienting, obsessive stylistics of literary modernism.

Language turns: the end of metaphysics

After the problem of naming, the next difficulty posed by the “end of philosophy” thematic is one of scope. How can something so broad and diverse as philosophy, with branches in countless other disciplines (philosophies of science, language, history, law, religion, and so on) be comprehensively closed down? Such a titanic feat would surely require a number of different strikes, from different strategic positions, to achieve its end. In fact, it is one key aspect of the philosophical tradition that is negated, and from this the whole tradition is disabled. That aspect is the method of metaphysical speculation and argument. Immanuel Kant proffered a critique of this tradition in his *Critique of Pure Reason* (1781); to some extent, then, philosophical post-modernism is operating in a post-Kantian context, driven by the urge to find new ways of resisting what Kant carefully circumscribed and confined.⁶

As a term, “metaphysics” was originally coined simply to indicate that which could not be explained by the physical sciences. Yet by the twentieth century it had accreted a whole range of meanings, indemnifying man’s (supposed) separation from nature, and fortifying the project of orthodox humanism. It also provided the linking factor between Cartesian foundationalism and Hegelian synthesis. Descartes famously pictured knowledge as a tree, with metaphysics as the root; by metaphysics, then, he meant largely epistemology. Similarly, Hegel’s *Phenomenology of Mind* was envisaged as a journey towards “absolute knowledge,” where mind realizes that the knowledge it has been seeking is self-knowledge, mind knowing itself as mind. Metaphysical humanism is thus characterized by the urge to *know*, yet this apparently noble impulse has a dubious underside – it can just as readily devolve into the desire to possess and master, to convert otherness and difference into sameness.

The postmodernist rejection of metaphysics was impelled by the turn towards language. In philosophical terms, this comes from two sources, usually regarded as antithetical. From within the analytical tradition, the late philosophy of Ludwig Wittgenstein bequeathed a new way of thinking and a new

terminology – “language games,” “family resemblance,” “forms of life,” the “private language argument” – that philosophical postmodernism has assimilated and reworked in its own image. And across the philosophical divide, in the continental tradition, Martin Heidegger saw one of the antidotes to the modern spiritual malaise as *poiesis* – creativity, in the broadest sense, but also the language of poetry, especially as manifested in a few key German poets (Hölderlin, Rilke, Georg Trakl). Both philosophers, therefore, were proponents of the “linguistic turn” in philosophy, albeit in very different ways. In the analytical tradition, the linguistic turn contended that the limits of philosophy, and of what was understood to be “reality,” could manifest themselves only within language. It was a turn from ideas to words, from an idealist philosophical focus to a language-centered one – a reversal, in short, of what Descartes had inaugurated with his inward turn towards ideas and the contents of the mind. For analytical philosophers, the ultimate facts were seen to be those of language. In keeping with this conviction, they concentrated on the kinds of human practices that grow from language and make it possible in the first place.⁷

Wittgenstein’s posthumous *Philosophical Investigations* mounted a critique of his earlier project (in the *Tractatus*) of seeking objective structures for language; instead, he came to see it as a purely human product and attempted to define the limits thereof.⁸ The focus was thus on the social perspective of linguistic analysis, and the ways in which everyday communication takes place. This has led to the description of his later philosophy (like the linguistic turn of analytical philosophy in general) as “anthropocentric.”⁹

A different state of affairs obtains in continental philosophy, and in the postmodernist theory evolving out of it. The linguistic turn here is based on the belief that, because language is riven with figuration – a “mobile army of metaphors, metonyms, and anthropomorphisms,” to borrow Nietzsche’s phrase¹⁰ – it cannot represent the world with any degree of accuracy, let alone in the immediate, undistorted way that some theories of mind have claimed. This could be simplified to say that words depend on *other* words for their meaning, rather than on reference to some extra-linguistic reality. From this comes the postmodernist dictum that language constructs human identity, rather than vice versa. Heidegger writes: “Man acts as though *he* were the shaper and master of language, while in fact *language* remains the master of man.”¹¹ The linguistic turn associated with the postmodern condition is thus quite explicitly antihumanist, denying human beings the instrumental command of language that supports the belief in “metaphysical man.”

In “The End of Philosophy and the Task of Thinking,” Heidegger describes how philosophy has lost its way. Philosophy’s end is nigh, he claims,

because it has evolved into all those things smuggled in by metaphysics – logic, science, technology, cybernetics, and forgetfulness (of Being). The end or “completion” of metaphysics, however, does not take the form of “perfection” towards which, Hegel declared, the tradition was moving, but rather harks back to the older sense of “place”: “The end of philosophy is the place, that place in which the whole of philosophy’s history is gathered in its uttermost possibility.”¹² Heidegger’s response to metaphysics is “thinking,” a task “that can be neither metaphysics nor science.”¹³ Such an activity will be an unassuming one, dedicated to awakening possibilities; yet it must also be resolutely present-based, rather than speculative.¹⁴ If “thinking” cannot undo the changes wrought by metaphysics, it can nevertheless help to alleviate the spiritually impoverished character of modernity.

The two currents of Wittgenstein and Heidegger converge in the neo-pragmatism of Richard Rorty (who also draws on the ur-pragmatism of John Dewey). For Rorty, the post-Kantian shape of western philosophy has been determined by epistemology, out of which metaphysics emerges (rather than vice versa, as in Descartes’s roots-and-trunk metaphor); philosophical modernity has thus been recast as a “theory of knowledge.” Seeking to overturn this state of affairs, Rorty’s version of the “end of philosophy” is directed towards the end of epistemology.

Philosophy’s transformation into a theory of knowledge was made possible by a theory of representation – the mind’s ability to “mirror” the external world, thereby establishing a certain congruence, or “fit,” between mind and world. Knowledge, says Rorty, is not about congruence so much as about social acceptance; it is what receives communal support or assent from one’s peers. With the loss of the “mirror of nature” idea, then, epistemology effectively *ends*.¹⁵ What replaces it? Rorty suggests that philosophers should abandon knowledge-seeking strategies for “edification,” a conversation that is always open to improvement. Edification is “this project of finding new, better, more interesting, more fruitful ways of speaking . . . edifying discourse is *supposed* to be abnormal, to take us out of our old selves by the power of strangeness, to aid us in becoming new beings.”¹⁶ Despite the laid-back manner of his writing, Rorty’s “post-philosophical” project is a genuine anomaly, seeking humanist ends (ethical improvement) through counter-humanist means (discourse rather than knowledge).

If Rorty sees epistemology as more fundamental than metaphysics, and censures it with the ethical, inter-subjective notion of “edification,” Heidegger’s one-time follower Emmanuel Levinas finds ethical reasons for *preserving* metaphysics – or at least for reworking it. Before metaphysics is anything, he declares, it is *ethics*. Levinas sees the philosophical systems of the West as having exercised, in the guise of ontology, a deep-seated

suppression of otherness. Countering this, he conceives of the ethical as non-foundational and prior to those systems (“ontology,” he writes, “pre-supposes metaphysics”).¹⁷ The ethical encounter, the face-to-face relation to the other, is the originary instance of metaphysics, its primordial enactment. In keeping with this attitude, Levinas has described the ends of humanism and metaphysics, and the death of God and of man, as “apocalyptic ideas or slogans of intellectual high society,” brought on by “the tyranny of the latest fashion.”¹⁸

Yet whether it is celebrated, substituted, or excoriated, the “end of metaphysics” thesis is a powerful current within philosophical postmodernism. In fact, it almost assumes the status of a metanarrative, an organizational paradigm to which even the most diverse “endist” attempt must inevitably refer, no matter how obliquely, to give its argument historical credence. The following sections demonstrate the scope and depth of this reliance.

Deregulated subjects: the end(s) of man

The metaphysical subject was an early casualty of philosophical postmodernism. In the western tradition, man has been the measure of all things and the maker of all meanings – and the autonomous, transcendental subject the “site” where meaning is incarnated. The strict separation of human and natural orders could be maintained by asserting that man was inherently “metaphysical,” a truth-hungry being who yearned for self-enlightenment. Equipped with this metaphysical optic, man was able to transform experience into knowledge, and his involvements in the world – no longer blind and present-based – into the material for human empowerment.

In the French philosophy of the 1960s, the subject lost its metaphysical aura.¹⁹ The temper of the times is apparent from the widespread eagerness to embrace the “death of the subject” – a diktat which became, as Perry Anderson noted, “the slogan of the decade.”²⁰ The proclamation filtered through the various disciplines associated with structuralist theory. In the anthropology of Claude Lévi-Strauss, man was reduced to an empty space, a mere vantage point where the codes and conventions of language and culture happened to coincide. Lacanian psychoanalysis saw the subject as subsequent to language, and always dependent on it for its existence. And in Louis Althusser’s post-Marxist suppositions, human subjectivity was considered an effect of ideology.²¹

But the most sustained and influential pronouncement of the “end of man” came from the historical discourse analysis of Michel Foucault. His anti-humanist spirit is made manifest in a single expression: man, he declares, is as an “empirico-transcendental doublet.” This strange entity arose because

of the human sciences, whose tendency to situate man as both origin (transcendental) and evaluative limit (empirical) placed him in a position that was unintelligible. As Dreyfus and Rabinow write, “Modernity begins with the incredible and ultimately unworkable idea of a being who is sovereign precisely by virtue of being enslaved, a being whose very finitude allows him to take the place of God.”²²

Taking stock of the scientific contradictions of the past 160 years that have made man the sacred being that he is, Foucault issues a bold declaration: “If those arrangements were to disappear as they appeared, then one can certainly wager that man would be erased, like a face drawn in sand at the edge of the sea.”²³ The figure of “man” is but a dim notation at the edge of the shore, awaiting the incoming tide of history, and with it his liquidation. For that tide will reveal man in his true aspect: not as a timeless, godlike being possessed of an immortal soul, but as an accidental, provisional creature, precariously poised between the “epistemological regions” of economics, biology, and philology.

The above debates about anthropocentrism have never been more than peripheral concerns in the mainstream of the anglophone world. (Not so in France, however, where the “philosopher king” is accorded a great deal of popular attention and even some measure of celebrity.) A more pressing debate here, which has infiltrated the media as well as the academy, concerns the relationships between human beings and the natural world, and between human beings and animals. Environmental anxieties, Green politics and debates about “speciesism” have decreased the sovereignty of the human animal more thoroughly than any number of structuralist–humanist debates could ever have done. What they share with the “death of the subject” thesis is the anti-anthropocentric conviction that man is no longer the measure of all things, but something to be measured, like anything else in the world. Whether as abstruse theoretical polemic or populist concern over ecological ruin, man’s dethronement continues.

Yet philosophical postmodernism still has something to contribute to these more pressing forms of “anthropological deregulation” – albeit couched in language and postulates rebarbative to a mainstream readership. The most prominent strand of postmodern ecological theory derives from Heidegger’s animadversions on nature. His antipathy to human action lies in the danger of the “will to will,” the infinite desire to master nature and dominate the earth. This craving for mastery, manifested through man’s technological command, is what lies behind the ruinous environmental practices of the twentieth century. Advocates of Green politics and radical environmentalism have used Heideggerian arguments to urge the adoption of a more benign and harmonious attitude towards the nonhuman world.²⁴

There is much less concern with harmony and restraint, or with human integration within nature, in the collaborative writing of Deleuze and Guattari. They state their position plainly, in the early pages of *Anti-Oedipus*:

We make no distinction between man and nature: the human essence of nature and the natural essence of man become one within nature in the form of production or industry, just as they do within the life of man as a species . . . man and nature are not like two opposite terms confronting one another . . . rather, they are one and the same essential reality, the producer-product.²⁵

In a later work, the monumental, multifaceted *Thousand Plateaus*, they impugn the “arborescent” model of thought, the model of organic growth and stolidity that makes the western tradition seem so implacable. (Descartes’s metaphor is the obvious target here.) Deleuze and Guattari adopt instead the “rhizome,” a multi-linked network which “operates by variation, expansion, conquest, capture, offshoots . . . an acented, nonhierarchical, nonsignifying system . . . defined solely by a circulation of states.”²⁶ To fasten such a diverse, multidisciplinary work to specific theses is a hopeless task. Yet one of the things this transformative text gestures towards is a new ecological understanding, a dynamic, nonhierarchical relationship between human beings and the natural environmental (plants and animals) that curbs human dominion and narcissism in a tour de force of ceaseless reinvention.²⁷

If ecology is only an interstitial concern in Deleuze and Guattari’s many-chambered book, it is at the forefront of Michel Serres’s *The Natural Contract*. He posits an alarmist view of our contemporary condition: “Global history enters nature; global nature enters history: this is something utterly new in philosophy.”²⁸ The violence of ownership has defined the modern era, the twofold desire for “war and property.” But interhuman conflict is being overshadowed by a different kind of violence, where man wages war on the world; indeed, Serres estimates that the combined effect of environmental disasters is equivalent to another world war.²⁹ He regards human despoliation of the natural environment as a form of ownership claim, akin to an animal marking its territory: “Thus the sullied world reveals the mark of humanity, the mark of its dominators, the found stamp of their hold and their appropriation.”³⁰ In the past, the social contract has conditioned and contained the waging of war; another kind of agreement is necessary, then, for this new type of warfare, a “natural contract.”

Counteracting Cartesian mastery, Serres emphasizes the need for a new, non-anthropocentric ecological schema. The natural contract he proposes is “metaphysical,” in that it goes beyond the physical. The latter, he suggests, is limited in its scope to the local and immediate; to think in global terms,

and of the furthest consequences of one's actions, is to think in metaphysical terms. Just as the social contract has united the immediate with the universal, so must the natural contract: "Together these laws [i.e. social and natural] ask each of us to pass from the local to the global, a difficult and badly marked trail, but one that we must blaze."³¹ Serres's impassioned argument has a further "doubleness": it pertains as much to everyday life – that is, to the living habits of individuals – as it is does to the elite realms of political assembly, where government legislation is drafted.

Police matters: the end of narrative

As should be clear, the end of human sovereignty is an ongoing project for philosophical postmodernism. Closely related to this is the questioning of another human-related practice. Alasdair MacIntyre raises the issue with his claim that "man is in his actions and practice, as well as in his fictions, essentially a story-telling animal."³² If this is so, then the interrogation of the human must extend to the ruses and machinations of narrative logic. In Roland Barthes's words, the past tense of narrative "is the ideal instrument for every construction of a world; it is the unreal time of cosmogonies, myth, History and Novels . . . The world is not unexplained since it is told like a story."³³

This is the disposition that Jean-François Lyotard seeks to unsettle in *The Postmodern Condition*. He mounts two related arguments about narrative. The first concerns "narrative knowledge," and its putative other, "scientific knowledge." The former, in the guise of storytelling, does not require "proof" beyond its own internal consistency and rules of procedure; beyond, that is to say, its heterogeneous status as a particular language game. Scientific knowledge, by contrast, has for centuries laid claim to being universal and authoritative, transcendent of all other language games. Science has traditionally regarded narrative knowledge with scorn, says Lyotard, yet despite this has used narrative to justify itself and its operations.³⁴

Lyotard also claims to be presenting a "report on knowledge." Knowledge requires legitimation, and it is here that his second argument about narrative takes shape. Two "grand narratives" have determined western self-understanding – the Enlightenment story of progress and political emancipation, and the Hegelian narrative of the manifestation of scientific reason. Both of these have foundered, he declares, along with every other meta-discursive attempt at organizing modernity's immense sprawl into something coherent and socially useful.³⁵ Postmodernity, by contrast, recognizes the impossibility of this undertaking and its need for legitimation, and recoils from it: "Simplifying to the extreme, I define *postmodern* as incredulity towards

metanarratives.”³⁶ In postmodernity, legitimation does not stand outside social practices, but is “plural, local, and immanent.” In other words, the language game of narrative has become a model for *every* kind of legitimation, no longer playing second fiddle to scientific “transcendence.” The death of the grand narrative thus heralds the birth of the local narrative, with its emphasis on diversity and heterogeneity.³⁷

Lyotard subsequently concretized his argument with examples of historical contradiction – Auschwitz confutes the Hegelian belief that history is “rational,” Stalin subverts the possibility of a proletarian revolution, crises in capitalist societies undermine the feasibility of the free-market economy.³⁸ Gianni Vattimo questions the thesis behind these claims in “The End of (Hi)story,” centering his argument on the problem of postmodernity. “If this notion has a meaning at all, it has to be described in terms of the end of history.” The implication of Lyotard’s conviction that metanarratives have ended is that “history itself has become impossible.”³⁹ And yet, as Vattimo argues, because Lyotard is using history to legitimate his thesis (in the examples above) he is, in effect, drawing on the organizing powers of a metanarrative.

There is a wider allusion, in Vattimo’s critique, to the subtle power of narrative to insinuate itself into historical discourse, an explicatory method that is almost a kind of “default setting.” By way of response, he cites Heidegger’s awareness that metaphysics is not something easily abandoned, since to do so would mean perpetuating its methods and structures.⁴⁰ We must acknowledge, then, that the “only way we have to argue in favor of postmodernist philosophy is still an appeal to history . . . only if we tell explicitly, again and again, the story of the end of history, shall we be able to change, distort, *verwinden*, its metaphysical significance.”⁴¹

Hayden White, however, has warned that it is not just historical metanarratives that pose problems but *any* fully realized historical narrative, no matter how “local” or limited. White mobilizes Hegel’s argument that “historicality” is unthinkable without a system of law, which in turn presupposes (and constitutes) a “legal subject.” He then suggests that the historical consciousness that looks to narrative logic as a way of (re)presenting the past will always use story in its *allegorical* mode; that is, it will make it a distinctly moral undertaking: “it seems possible to conclude that every historical narrative has as its latent or manifest purpose the desire to *moralize* the events of which it treats.”⁴² (Derrida expressed this more pungently when he declared that “all organized narration is ‘a matter for the police,’ even before its genre (mystery novel, cop story) has been determined.”)⁴³

But if Lyotard, Vattimo, and White suggest that narrative has become an intractable problem for philosophy, that is not (as it were) the whole story. American pragmatism has embraced the possibilities of narrative knowledge,

as MacIntyre's remark above indicates. In the postmodern pragmatism of Richard Rorty, a similar endorsement is made. Through "genres such as ethnography, the journalist's report, the comic book, the docudrama, and, especially, the novel," Rorty envisages "a general turn against theory and toward narrative." The kinds of narratives he has in mind would "connect the present with the past, on the one hand, and with utopian futures, on the other."⁴⁴ Rorty is unconcerned with the side-effects of storytelling practices; in the ongoing conversation of mankind, narrative logic is a resource to be harnessed. As a form of discourse it can edify and hence assist the post-philosophical project of the future in reducing the amount of cruelty and suffering in the world. That there *is* a world beyond narrative discourse is not disputed; other thinkers of philosophical postmodernism are less certain, as the next section illustrates.

Real simulations: the end of the world

In a typically caustic and condensed section of *Twilight of the Idols*, Nietzsche seeks to show "How the 'Real World' Became a Fable." In six short moves the "real world" – the metaphysical realm of truth persisting beyond the ephemeral world of appearance – escapes human grasp. First it is attainable, then successively promised, consolatory, unknowable, and refutable. Once refuted, this "real world" disappears – along with its "apparent world" double.⁴⁵ The two worlds, clearly, are codependent. Because the world of appearance is somehow anchored by its deeper, "truer" metaphysical complement, dismissing the senior partner means dissolving the entire relationship.

A continuation of this line of thinking was undertaken by Jean Baudrillard in the 1980s. Attending to the postmodern condition of media saturation, Baudrillard charted the disappearance of a different kind of "real world": the concrete, material foundation to which human systems of signification point. Thus, instead of the couple sign/object, with its promise of a substantive "ground" beneath the various forms of cultural representation – something to anchor those representations, like Nietzsche's "real world" of metaphysical verity – there are only the representations themselves, mere "simulations" of concrete reality. Abandoning the metaphysical couple of surface/depth, and the notion of a transcendental "inner" realm, thus prefigures a loss of referentiality. Pursuing this further, Baudrillard sets out in four moves what Nietzsche did in six. Initially referring to a material reality beyond itself, the sign then distorts, disguises, and finally replaces that reality.⁴⁶ Baudrillard's catalogue of disappearances cuts across Saussurean linguistics (signified/referent), Marxist economics (exchange-value/use-value) and religious idolatry (icon/deity).⁴⁷

In the absence of the “real,” there is only the “hyperreal.” As Baudrillard describes it in “. . . Or the End of the Social,” the hyperreal is not a heightening or distortion of the real, but a “meticulous reduplication,” executed with such “macroscopic hyperfidelity” as to efface all signs of its counterfeit status.⁴⁸ It is the abolition of distance between the real and its representational double that produces the hyperreal, eliminating referentiality in the process. The social contract, as Michel Serres noted, has a distancing function; it maintains civility by organizing social relations around legal codes. When the social relation becomes hyperreal, however, the “hyper-social” is produced and distancing is lost.⁴⁹

There is a historical component to Baudrillard’s argument. The hyperreal has displaced the real because one thing has made it possible: technology. Baudrillard’s most notorious move was to apply his philosophy of disappearance to the first Gulf War. After a “hot war” and a “cold war,” the (techno)logical next step, he argued, was a “virtual war.”⁵⁰ Foreshadowed by his analysis of Nixon’s bombing of Hanoi,⁵¹ Baudrillard asserts that whatever it was that took place in the Persian Gulf – a CNN simulation of a Hollywood blockbuster, a hyperreal video game, an exercise in New World Order police tactics – it bore no resemblance to any kind of “war.” (Hence his title, *The Gulf War Did Not Take Place*, with its witty echo of a play by Jean Giraudoux.)⁵²

Baudrillard’s polemic provides a scaffold for Christopher Norris to identify (in the words of an earlier indictment) what’s wrong with postmodernism.⁵³ As Norris sees it, Baudrillard claimed that the Gulf War took place on *no* fronts, but only on the depthless, ephemeral plane of the CNN broadcasts. Norris then makes the counter-claim that it actually took place on *two* fronts. The Iraqi targets in Baghdad and Kuwait, with their casualties and collateral damage, constituted the first front; and the postmodern affectations of scepticism and cynicism, and accompanying talk of “simulacra” and “hyper-reality,” amounted to a second, equally treacherous war zone. Norris positions himself as a latter-day Orwell-in-Catalonia, anxious lest the truth about the war get hijacked by the forces of acquiescence. Because postmodern nihilism is powerless to unmask media disinformation, says Norris, it is unwittingly complicit with the manufacturers of consensus.

The need for “critical resistance” is not lost on Baudrillard: “Be more virtual than the events themselves, do not seek to re-establish the truth, we do not have the means, but do not be duped . . . Turn deterrence back against itself.”⁵⁴ For Norris this knowing complicity, this immanent insurgency, is doubly dangerous. First, from Norris’s standpoint no critical resistance can be properly mounted without critical distance; second, and more damagingly, in aspiring to be, as it were, more virtual than the virtual, Baudrillard further

erodes the distinction between truth and falsehood that Norris is so anxious to maintain, on which he has staked his entire critical stock. Yet despite this, Baudrillard's position evinces a clear-eyed awareness of one thing: that our postmodern condition is precisely that, a *condition*, and not (as Norris would insist) a figment of a decadent, nihilistic intellectual imagination. To deny this condition is, ironically, to disqualify in advance – or at least to curtail considerably – the possibility of resistance. Philosophers of postmodernism have taken up this possibility in different ways, such as we have already seen in the debates about ecology. The next section demonstrates an equally concerted challenge to consensus thinking.

Identity crisis: the end of “man”

Thus far we have seen philosophical postmodernism described as postmetaphysical, anti-anthropocentric, counter-humanist, non-narrative and hyper-realist. Postmodern feminist philosophy provides a crossroads where all these critiques meet. As Linda Hutcheon has argued, feminist practices have shaped to a large extent the emergence and development of postmodernist styles of thought (though she is careful not to conflate feminism with postmodernism).⁵⁵ In the field of philosophy, feminist thinkers such as Irigaray have seen the tradition as a site of ceaseless conflict: “The philosophical order is indeed the one that has to be questioned, and *disturbed*, inasmuch as it covers over sexual difference.”⁵⁶

Central to this order is the question of subjectivity. But rather than subscribing to the 1960s’ “death of the subject” scenario – which culminates in Foucault’s pronouncement of the “end of man” – feminist philosophy in the 1970s considered the question on its own terms. The constructed nature of subjectivity was not an occasion for anguish and loss (as Lacan describes the shift from being to meaning) or for false consciousness (Althusser’s theory of “interpellation”). Rather, the subaltern status of women meant that subjectivity was a privilege consistently and determinedly withheld from them. As Irigaray put it, “Any theory of the subject is always appropriated by the masculine.”⁵⁷ But in repudiating the disembodied, metaphysical “reasoning subject,” whose role in western culture has been to protect and promote male ideals, feminists were not abandoning the subject *tout entier*.⁵⁸ Julia Kristeva, for example, has deployed the notion of the “speaking subject” – a process, rather than a result, where contradiction and change are not problems but givens.⁵⁹

At root in western metaphysics is the logocentric nature of patriarchy, or *phallogocentrism*. Kristeva writes: “The very dichotomy man/woman as an opposition between two rival entities may be understood as belonging to

metaphysics. What can ‘identity’, even ‘sexual identity,’ mean in a new theoretical and scientific space where the very notion of identity is challenged?”⁶⁰ If phallogocentric practices suppress difference in favor of identity – in particular, the self-identity conferred by oneness, autonomy, and integrity, co-extensive with notions of (male) subjectivity – then the philosophical censoring of metaphysics issues a bold challenge to the logic of identity.

Irigaray has both contested the notion of identity and advocated a specific female identity. Her argument turns on the distinction between *identity* and *identification*. The futural, as-yet-unrealized female identity she advances will not be based on sameness; it will not be an identity enabling its bearer to *identify* with the static, fixed attributes of a particular order. The project of developing a women’s identity will therefore be a transformative one, altering the very nature and meaning of “identity.”⁶¹ Bringing this new, undetermined identity into being presupposes a fundamental restructuring of the symbolic economy. There is some similarity here with Baudrillard’s strategy of disruptive immanence, of being “more virtual than the virtual.” Irigaray’s feminine metaphysics works against conventional metaphysics, bypassing absolute truths for the modes and workings of concepts and discourse.

Cutting the ground out from (Cartesian) foundationalism and dispersing (Hegelian) synthesis, Irigaray argues that female subjectivity, identity, and essence are projects to be realized rather than pillars on which to build, and are resistant to the imposition of a teleology. She writes: “In order to become, it is essential to have a gender or an essence (consequently a sexuate essence) as *horizon*. Otherwise, becoming remains partial and subject to the subject . . . To become means fulfilling the wholeness of what we are capable of being. Obviously, this road never ends.”⁶² A horizon is not a “goal” as such; where a goal can be attained, a horizon cannot be reached without its ceasing to be a horizon. Similarly, a metaphysical becoming can strive for “wholeness” without congealing into a fixed or final identity. As Christine Battersby notes, “Flow, flux, becoming do not always have to be envisaged in terms of a movement that is alien to persisting identity or to metaphysics itself.”⁶³

Attempting to rework the metaphysics of identity is misguided and myopic, counters Judith Butler. The term “women,” she argues, “marks a dense intersection of social relations that cannot be summarized through the terms of identity.”⁶⁴ The error is compounded by treating the signifying economy as if it were monolithic and masculinist – a totalizing gesture that is a form of “epistemological imperialism.” Butler writes: “The effort to identify the enemy as singular in form is a reverse-discourse that uncritically mimics the strategy of the oppressor instead of offering a different set of terms.”⁶⁵ Though Irigaray does see the philosophical order as cohesive and monolithic,

her interrogation of it is tireless and punctilious, and her writing style bristles with provocation. Further, in the horizon constituted by sexual difference – one that is “more fecund than any known to date – at least in the West” – Irigaray imagines there might be space for the “creation of a new *poetics*.”⁶⁶

The nature of Irigaray’s “horizon” is also problematic for Butler, however, who is more concerned with the behavioral notion of gender than with embodied notions of sexual difference. Gender, she declares, is not an inert category with fixed attributes, but a contingent *doing*, a “stylized repetition of acts.”⁶⁷ It points towards a destabilization of identity: “There is no gender identity behind the expressions of gender; that identity is performatively constituted by the very ‘expressions’ that are said to be its results.”⁶⁸ Gender attributes, then, do not express a stable identity preceding the act of performance and enduring through time. Instead, they consist in a provisional repertoire depending on reiteration for its existence, and hence are potentially fluid and variable.

In the absence of fixed identities, the fixity of identity politics is also abandoned. If gender roles are variable, fluid, and multiple, they lend themselves to oppositional strategies, principally in the form of parodic subversion. Such strategies are, however, restricted to individual gender “performances.” Butler’s reluctance to see the symbolic economy as unitary means that collective resistance to it, in the guise of political reform or universal panacea, is also untenable. The “metaphysical” contract that Serres proposes, with its movement from the local to the global, is not an option in Butler’s all-out war against stable identity.

From the point of view of language, identity is also invoked through “presence”: if words and their meanings are congruent, if they can be mapped without remainder or deficit, then there is perfect, self-present *identity*. Resisting (or reworking) the metaphysics of identity leads then, perhaps inevitably, to the search for a new discourse, and to a form of writing that might convey it adequately. Irigaray makes reference to a “feminine syntax,” exemplified in “more and more texts written by women in which another writing is beginning to assert itself.”⁶⁹

Within postmodern feminism, the writing alluded to here goes by the name of *écriture féminine*, a writing of the female body that “will always surpass the discourse that regulates the phallogocentric system.”⁷⁰ Much has been written about its potential for disruption, liberation, and pleasure, its manifesting in literary terms many of the claims made above for sexual difference. (Indeed, before it was a theory of gender, performativity was a theory of language.)⁷¹ Though there is some doubt as to whether or not it matches the claims made for it by theorists, it might be seen as underwriting Linda Hutcheon’s affirmation above about the profound influence of feminism on

postmodernism. Gayatri Spivak writes: “In a certain sense the definitive characteristic of the French feminist project of founding a woman’s discourse reflects a coalition with the continuing tradition of the French *avant-garde*.”⁷²

This “continuing tradition,” I suggest, abides in philosophical postmodernism, which is above all a powerful and original form of *writing*. Its fugitive, elliptical nature still arouses heated debate, suggesting that the full measure of its textual stylistics has yet to be taken. If such a thing as an aesthetics of theory were possible, it might consider the difficult, self-conscious nature of much theoretical writing, particularly as it has developed in France; the way its assertions are conveyed through codes of association and abrupt transition, resisting the logic of causal development; its use of ludic, performative language in noninstrumental ways, incorporating sly puns, audacious juxtapositions, and eccentric allusions; and the general resistance it presents to distillation, paraphrase, and quotation.

Furthermore, its sheer stylistic brio – often operating at the outermost edge of coherence – is equally at odds with the prose conventions of critical exposition as it is with the tradition of philosophical proposition and elaboration. I suggested earlier that the elusive quality of this writing had much in common with literary modernism. It is both broader and narrower than that. As a mode of articulation, rather than as a specific linguistic practice, post-Nietzschean continental philosophy leans towards the condition of poetry – but a poetry of compaction and intensity, effectively revitalizing the stylistic pact of the early twentieth-century *avant-garde*.

After the end: towards posthuman becoming

“The whole problem of speaking about the end (particularly the end of history) is that you have to speak of what lies beyond the end and also, at the same time, of the impossibility of ending.”⁷³ As Jean Baudrillard makes clear, once the discourse of “endism” is entered into, it becomes impossible to escape the aporetic bind of termination-and-reprieve. But if the situation now is no longer so pressing or disabling, it is because the various forms of endism have, for the most part, ended. In fact, it was Jacques Derrida (a resolute anti-endist from the start, as we have seen) who in 1983 launched a critique of the portentous rhetoric that has accreted around the “end of philosophy.” Even Kant, in his day, Derrida argued, denounced the “apocalyptic” claims that philosophy was at an end – at the same time as he “freed another wave of eschatological discourses in his philosophy.” (Endism as a form of negative capability was extant even in the eighteenth century.)⁷⁴

The move away from endist thinking is reflected in the shift from theoretical and philosophical antihumanism – whose tenets were all in place by

1968 – to what might be termed technological posthumanism. Drawing on the cybernetic advancements of the last three decades, which have threatened to disfigure the integrated physical nature of human being, the balance of ending-and-renewal shifts decisively towards the latter. For thinkers of the posthuman, it is a moot point whether the human is obsolete or not; it will be technologically upgraded, and its anticipated successor avidly pursued, even if the old model still prospers. Philosophical inquiry implements a powerful metaphorical paradigm for this in the condition of endless becoming, where origins and ends are negated by a process of metamorphic perpetuity with no (final) result.

The feminist focus on the body, the transgression of boundaries, and the disruption of identity merge with the philosophical concerns of the posthuman. The rapprochement can be seen in Irigaray's feminist praxis ("The goal that is most valuable is to go on *becoming*, infinitely")⁷⁵ and in Butler's assertion that "*woman* itself is a term in process, a becoming, a constructing that cannot rightfully be said to originate or end."⁷⁶ The source of this orientation, once again, is Nietzsche – though its philosophical ancestry stretches back to Hegel, for whom becoming was envisaged as the unity of being and nothing; and to Heraclitus, who famously viewed existence, not as a condition of stable being, but as a process of continual change and conflict. The Nietzschean cosmos, accordingly, is conceived as a ceaseless becoming, without aim or achievement, progress, or destiny. Because becoming must be justified at every moment, it reveals itself in eternal recurrence ("Everything becomes and recurs eternally") and will to power ("Regarded mechanistically, the energy of the totality of becoming remains constant").⁷⁷

Taking up this line of thought, Deleuze fashions a tool to break apart temporal unity. Becomings are above all *creative*, escaping the present with its orderly demarcations of before and after, past and future: "Becomings belong to geography, they are orientations, directions, entries and exits."⁷⁸ The rhizome illustrates this by linking up all points with one another, in contrast to the "arborescent" model and its method of contiguous connection. Becoming takes place through a line or block without beginning or end, origin or destination. A line of becoming has only a middle: it "is neither one nor two, nor the relation of the two; it is the in-between."⁷⁹ Deleuzian becoming thus defies any kind of stability – physical, conceptual, spatio-temporal. It is a plateau of thought that aims to unleash a force of pure transgression, to realize a permanent revolution in social relations (or what Deleuze would term "becoming-revolutionary"). It operates not through resemblance, imitation, or identification, nor via correspondence or filiation, but only through *alliance*. Thus, the becoming is real, even if what the human

becomes – animal, woman, child, girl – is not. Neither can it lend itself to the production of identity or meaning: “Becoming produces nothing other than itself.”⁸⁰

As I have suggested, philosophical becoming is the primary condition of possibility for thinking the posthuman. Perhaps its most influential application is the model of the cyborg – a “becoming” that is neither human nor posthuman, but a threshold leading from one to the other.⁸¹ In “A Cyborg Manifesto,” Donna Haraway complicates easy divisions between the human and the natural, showing the former’s fusion with animals and machines.⁸² For Haraway, the cyborg is an ironic, perverse creature, beyond gender and without origin (i.e. a myth of unity and fullness). It is an imaginative resource out of (feminist) science fiction, the postmodern dream of hybridity realized as a technocultural fantasy. Haraway uses the cyborg as a multiple disrupter of categories and identities and, like Deleuzian becoming, as a form of alliance: “One is too few, but two are too many.”⁸³ Divisions between the physical and the nonphysical also cannot be maintained. Thus, cyborgs do not exist as such – they are “ether, quintessence” – yet are all too real: “in short, we are cyborgs.”⁸⁴

Haraway uses the figuration in two ways. First, the primary cyborg alliance is with women, whose identities are similarly nonexistent, borrowed, incomplete, and “other.” And second, it inveighs against feminist theories of embodiment that have demonized technological freedom, favoring bodies over minds, nature over culture, biology over technology. Rather than reversing these dichotomies, cyborg feminism demonstrates how unsustainable they are. “The machine is us, our processes, an aspect of our embodiment.”⁸⁵ Haraway’s cybernetic antihumanism is not unequivocal; she recognizes its potential for domination and subjugation, as well as for emancipation. But the conceptual distinctions she attempts to elide raise difficult questions about ethical responsibility and political efficacy.⁸⁶

These questions are implicitly addressed in the dystopian prognostications of Paul Virilio. Unlike the advocates of technological posthumanism, Virilio’s work in the 1990s attended more to “ending” than to “renewal.” In *Open Sky* he approaches human–mechanical convergence through alienating teletechnology (action at a distance) and invasive nanotechnology (miniaturized components that “explore” the human metabolism). Between them they have precipitated the “pollution of the life-size,” or “the unperceived pollution of the distances that organize our relationships with others, and also with the world of sense experience.”⁸⁷ The absolute speed of immediacy and instantaneity creates a blurring of subject and object, a form of technological embodiment that bodes ill for individual self-realization. “Interactivity,” warns Virilio, is as dangerous for human well-being as “radioactivity.”⁸⁸

The gloomiest implication of the new technologies is that they are manufacturing the interactive means to wipe out temporality itself. Virilio's master-theme is the "general accident,"⁸⁹ a vague yet all-encompassing occurrence whose main feature will be an "unprecedented temporal breakdown." Time itself will crash, duration will freeze, and there will be only perpetual present;⁹⁰ or, in the book's epigrammatic announcement: "One day / the day will come / when the day won't come." The general accident foretells a narrative about the end of narrative, where temporal difference is liquidated and time becomes "self-identical." Its eschatological purport is matched by an earlier alarmist tract against absolute speed:

In these conditions, how can one fail to see the role of the *last vehicle*, whose non-travelling traveller, non-passing passenger, would be the ultimate stranger, a deserter from himself, an exile both from the external world (the real space of vanishing geophysical extension) and from the internal world, alien to his animal body, whose mass would be as fragile as the body of the planet already is as it undergoes advanced extermination?⁹¹

Ecological calamity and human self-estrangement are run together here, just as the general accident anticipates narrative foreclosure and the suspension of history.

What are we to make of these dire pronouncements? At the very least, they describe humankind as being entirely unequipped for the arrival of the posthuman. But Virilio's doomsday scenarios could also be read as a meta-commentary on the philosophy of ends itself. The collapse of distance on which the hyperreal and the cyborg are predicated, and the more general yearning for immanence – the desire for dissolution, disruption, and disintegration, for a condition where hierarchy and identity no longer prevail – are figured as bleak and malevolent prospects. Even ecological schemas such as Serres proposes, where concern is shifted from the local to the global, are no solution; it was the speed of global communication that produced the psychosocial torpor of "polar inertia" in the first place. Virilio is the last endist, recuperating the most abiding concern of philosophical post-modernism, even as he shows its ominous determinations and potentially hazardous consequences for life in the twenty-first century.

NOTES

1. Luce Irigaray, *An Ethics of Sexual Difference*, trans. Carolyn Burke and Gillian C. Gill (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1993), p. 5.
2. Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, *What is Philosophy?*, trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Graham Burchell (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), p. 9.
3. Jacques Derrida, *Positions*, trans. Alan Bass (London: Athlone, 1972), p. 6.

4. Jacques Derrida, *Of Grammatology*, trans. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak (Baltimore, MD, and London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976), p. 18.
5. *Ibid.*, p. 4.
6. Though dissociating deconstruction from postmodernism in general, Christopher Norris has stressed this aspect of Jacques Derrida's philosophy: "the issues [Derrida] raises belong within the tradition of Kantian enlightened critique, even while pressing that tradition to the limits (and beyond) of its own self-legitimizing claims." See *Derrida* (London: Fontana, 1987), p. 167. See also pp. 94–5, 147–50.
7. Analytical philosophy may have denounced metaphysics, but it nevertheless lends it covert support through its faith in science. Derrida, for example, has referred to "the classical notion of science, whose projects, concepts and norms are fundamentally and systematically tied to metaphysics." See his *Positions*, p. 13.
8. Crucial in this regard is Wittgenstein's notion of "language games," different modes of utterance corresponding to different social institutions, each following its own set of rules. See his *Philosophical Investigations*, trans. G. E. M. Anscombe (Oxford: Blackwell, 1958), p. 5. For examples, see p. 11.
9. See David Pears, *Wittgenstein* (London: Fontana, 1971), p. 103. This has not prevented Jean-François Lyotard from using Wittgenstein's philosophy for antihumanist ends. See Lyotard, *The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge*, trans. Geoff Bennington and Brian Massumi (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1984), pp. 9–11.
10. Friedrich Nietzsche, "On Truth and Lie in an Extra-Moral Sense," in Walter Kaufmann (ed.), *The Portable Nietzsche* (New York: Random House, 1980), p. 46.
11. Martin Heidegger, *Basic Writings*, ed. David Farrell Krell (London: Routledge, 1978), p. 348.
12. *Ibid.*, p. 433.
13. *Ibid.*, p. 436.
14. *Ibid.*, p. 437.
15. Richard Rorty, *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1980), ch. 6.
16. *Ibid.*, p. 360.
17. Emmanuel Levinas, *Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority*, trans. Alphonso Lingis (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1979), p. 48.
18. Emmanuel Levinas, *Humanisme de l'autre homme* (Montpellier: Fata Morgana, 1972), p. 95. Quoted in Colin Davis, *Levinas: An Introduction* (Cambridge: Polity, 1996), p. 124.
19. See Luc Ferry and Alain Renaut, *French Philosophy of the Sixties: An Essay On Antihumanism* (Amherst, MA: University of Massachusetts Press, 1990), p. 8.
20. Perry Anderson, *In the Tracks of Historical Materialism* (London: Verso, 1983), p. 37.
21. See Claude Lévi-Strauss, *The Savage Mind* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1966); Jacques Lacan, *Écrits: Selections*, trans. Alan Sheridan (London: Routledge, 1989); Louis Althusser, *Lenin and Philosophy and Other Essays*, trans. Ben Brewster (London: New Left Books, 1971), p. 160.
22. Hubert L. Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow, *Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics* (Brighton: Harvester, 1982), p. 30.

23. Michel Foucault, *The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences* (London: Routledge, 1970), p. 387.
24. See, for example, Michael E. Zimmerman, "Rethinking the Heidegger-Deep Ecology Relation," *Environmental Ethics* 15 (1993), pp. 195–224; Charles Taylor, "Heidegger, Language and Ecology," in Hubert L. Dreyfus and Harrison Hall (eds.), *Heidegger: A Critical Reader* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992); David Michael Levin, *The Opening of Vision: Nihilism and the Postmodern Situation* (New York and London: Routledge, 1988).
25. Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, *Anti-Oedipus*, trans. Robert Hurley, Mark Seem, and Helen R. Lane (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1983), pp. 4–5.
26. Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus*, trans. Brian Massumi (Minneapolis, MN, and London: University of Minnesota Press, 1987), p. 21.
27. Philip Goodchild suggests that "Deleuze and Guattari have constructed the first ethic appropriate to such an ecological vision of the world." See *Deleuze and Guattari: An Introduction to the Politics of Desire* (London: Sage, 1996), pp. 211–13. Guattari himself produced an essay exploring the "social ecology" of life under capitalism, wherein he developed a context for thinking beyond exploitative power relations known as "ecosophy." See his *The Three Ecologies*, trans. Ian Pindar and Paul Sutton (London: Athlone, 2001).
28. Michel Serres, *The Natural Contract*, trans. Elizabeth MacArthur and William Paulson (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1995), p. 4.
29. *Ibid.*, p. 32.
30. *Ibid.*, p. 33.
31. *Ibid.*, p. 50.
32. Alasdair MacIntyre, *After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory* (London: Duckworth, 1981), p. 201.
33. Roland Barthes, *Writing Degree Zero*, trans. Annette Lavers and Colin Smith (London: Jonathan Cape, 1967), p. 30.
34. Lyotard, *Postmodern Condition*, pp. 27–9.
35. *Ibid.*, pp. 31–7.
36. *Ibid.*, p. xxvi.
37. *Ibid.*, p. 30.
38. Jean-François Lyotard, "Histoire universelle et différences culturelles," *Critique* 456 (May 1985), p. 561.
39. Gianni Vattimo, "The End of (Hi)story," in Ingeborg Hoesterey (ed.), *Zeitgeist in Babel* (Bloomington and Indianapolis, IN: Indiana University Press, 1991), p. 134.
40. *Ibid.*, p. 136.
41. *Ibid.*, p. 139.
42. Hayden White, "The Value of Narrativity in the Representation of Reality," in W. J. T. Mitchell (ed.), *On Narrative* (Chicago, IL, and London: University of Chicago Press, 1981), p. 14.
43. Jacques Derrida, "Living On: Borderlines," in Harold Bloom *et al.*, *Deconstruction and Criticism* (London and Henley: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1979), p. 105.
44. Richard Rorty, *Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), p. xvi.

45. Friedrich Nietzsche, *Twilight of the Idols and The Anti-Christ*, trans. R. J. Hollingdale (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1968), pp. 40–1.
46. Jean Baudrillard, *Simulations* (New York: Semiotext(e), 1983), p. 10.
47. See Baudrillard, *The Mirror of Production* (St Louis, MO: Telos, 1975) and *Simulations*.
48. Jean Baudrillard, *In the Shadow of the Silent Majorities . . . Or the End of the Social* (New York: Semiotext(e), 1983), p. 85.
49. *Ibid.*
50. Jean Baudrillard, *The Gulf War Did Not Take Place*, trans. Paul Patton (Sydney: Power, 1995).
51. See Baudrillard, *Simulations*, p. 69.
52. *La guerre de Troie n'aura pas lieu* (1935). Baudrillard, in a later piece, points out the “many analogies between the Trojan and Gulf wars.” See his *The Illusion of the End*, trans. Chris Turner (Cambridge: Polity, 1994), p. 64.
53. Christopher Norris, *Uncritical Theory: Postmodernism, Intellectuals and the Gulf War* (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1992).
54. Baudrillard, *Gulf War*, pp. 66–7.
55. Linda Hutcheon, *The Politics of Postmodernism* (London: Routledge, 1989), p. 142.
56. Luce Irigaray, *This Sex Which Is Not One*, trans. Catherine Porter and Carolyn Burke (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1985), p. 159.
57. Luce Irigaray, *Speculum of the Other Woman*, trans. Gillian C. Gill (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1985).
58. For an account of female “subjecthood,” and the necessity of renewing the Enlightenment contract of human agency and emancipation, see Nancy Hartsock, “Foucault on Power: A Theory for Women?,” in Linda Nicholson (ed.), *Feminism/Postmodernism* (New York: Routledge, 1990), pp. 157–75.
59. See Julia Kristeva, “The System and the Speaking Subject,” in Toril Moi (ed.), *The Kristeva Reader* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1986), pp. 25–6.
60. Julia Kristeva, “Women’s Time,” *Kristeva Reader*, p. 209.
61. See Margaret Whitford, *Luce Irigaray: Philosophy in the Feminine* (New York and London: Routledge, 1991), p. 136.
62. Luce Irigaray, *Sexes and Genealogies*, trans. Gillian C. Gill (New York: Columbia University Press), p. 61.
63. Christine Battersby, *The Phenomenal Woman: Feminist Metaphysics and the Patterns of Identity* (Cambridge: Polity, 1998), p. 101.
64. Judith Butler, *Bodies that Matter: On the Discursive Limits of “Sex”* (New York and London: Routledge, 1993), p. 218.
65. Judith Butler, *Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity* (New York and London: Routledge, 1990), p. 13. Battersby gives credence to this aspect of Butler’s critique: “For Irigaray, the history of western philosophy remains the expression of a seamless masculine imaginary.” See *Phenomenal Woman*, p. 56.
66. Irigaray, *Ethics of Sexual Difference*, p. 5.
67. Butler, *Gender Trouble*, p. 140.
68. *Ibid.*, p. 25.
69. Irigaray, *This Sex Which Is Not One*, p. 134.
70. Hélène Cixous, “The Laugh of the Medusa”, in Elaine Marks and Isabelle de Courtivron (eds.), *New French Feminisms* (Brighton: Harvester, 1981), p. 253.

71. See J. L. Austin, *How to Do Things with Words* (London: Oxford University Press, 1962).
72. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, "French Feminism in an International Frame," *Yale French Studies* 62 (1981), p. 166.
73. Baudrillard, *Illusion of the End*, p. 110.
74. Jacques Derrida, "On a Newly Arisen Apocalyptic Tone in Philosophy," trans. John Leavey, Jr., in Peter Fenves (ed.), *Raising the Tone of Philosophy: Late Essays by Immanuel Kant, Transformative Critique by Jacques Derrida* (Baltimore, MD, and London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993), p. 144.
75. Irigaray, *Sexes and Genealogies*, p. 61.
76. Butler, *Gender Trouble*, p. 35.
77. Friedrich Nietzsche, *The Will to Power*, trans. Walter Kaufmann and R. J. Hollingdale (New York: Vintage, 1968), pp. 545, 340. See also pp. 13, 377 and 378.
78. Gilles Deleuze and Clare Parnet, *Dialogues*, trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam (New York: Columbia University Press, 1987), p. 2.
79. Deleuze and Guattari, *Thousand Plateaus*, p. 293.
80. *Ibid.*, p. 238.
81. See Gill Kirkup, Linda Janes, and Kathryn Woodward (eds.), *The Gendered Cyborg: A Reader* (London and New York: Routledge, 2000); *Technologies of the Gendered Body: Reading Cyborg Women*, (Durham, NC, and London: Duke University Press, 1996); and Judith Halberstam and Ira Livingston (eds.), *Posthuman Bodies* (Bloomington and Indianapolis, IN: Indiana University Press, 1995).
82. Donna J. Haraway, *Simians, Cyborgs, and Women: The Reinvention of Nature* (London: Free Association, 1991), pp. 150-3.
83. *Ibid.*, p. 177.
84. *Ibid.*, pp. 153, 150.
85. *Ibid.*, p. 180.
86. See Kate Soper, "Future Culture: Realism, Humanism and the Politics of Nature," *Radical Philosophy* 102 (July/August 2000), pp. 23-4.
87. Paul Virilio, *Open Sky*, trans. Julie Rose (London and New York: Verso, 1997), p. 59.
88. *Ibid.*, p. 118.
89. It also appears in Virilio's more recent works, *Politics of the Very Worst: An Interview By Philippe Petit*, trans. Michael Cavaliere (New York: Semiotext(e), 1999), and *The Information Bomb*, trans. Chris Turner (London: Verso, 2000).
90. Virilio, *Open Sky*, pp. 69-71.
91. Paul Virilio, *Polar Inertia*, trans. Patrick Camiller (London: Sage, 2000), p. 86. Originally published in 1990.