Product Description
Undoubtedly, emotions sometimes
thwart our epistemic endeavours. But do they also contribute to epistemic
success? The thesis that emotions "skew the epistemic landscape", as Peter
Goldie puts it in this volume, has long been discussed in epistemology.
Recently, however, philosophers have called for a systematic reassessment of the
epistemic relevance of emotions. The resulting debate at the interface between
epistemology, theory of emotions and cognitive science examines emotions in a
wide range of functions. These include motivating inquiry, establishing
relevance, as well as providing access to facts, beliefs and non-propositional
aspects of knowledge.This volume is the first collection focusing on the claim
that we cannot but account for emotions if we are to understand the processes
and evaluations related to empirical knowledge. All essays are specifically
written for this collection by leading researchers in this relatively new and
developing field, bringing together work from backgrounds such as pragmatism and
scepticism, cognitive theories of emotions and cognitive science, Cartesian
epistemology and virtue epistemology.
About the Author
Georg
Brun, Senior Research Fellow, Environmental Philosophy Group, Department of
Environmental Sciences, ETH Zurich, Switzerland; Ulvi Doguoglu, Research
Associate, Zurich University of Applied Sciences, Switzerland and Dominique
Kuenzle, Research Assistant, Department of Philosophy, University of Zurich,
Switzerland.